Taking up the White Man’s Burden? American Empire and the Question of History by Höglund, Johan
 European journal of American studies 
2-2 | 2007
Autumn 2007
Taking up the White Man’s Burden? American







European Association for American Studies
 
Electronic reference
Johan Höglund, « Taking up the White Man’s Burden? American Empire and the Question of History », 
European journal of American studies [Online], 2-2 | 2007, document 5, Online since 14 December 2007,
connection on 20 April 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ejas/1542  ; DOI : 10.4000/
ejas.1542 
This text was automatically generated on 20 April 2019.
Creative Commons License
Taking up the White Man’s Burden?




1 If  Britain obtained its  empire in ''a  fit  of  absence of  mind,''  as  Sir  John Seeley once
remarked,1 the United States has acquired its empire in a state of deep denial,  or so
Michael  Ignatieff  argued  in  an  article  from  2003.2 It  would  seem that  this  denial
characterizes large portions of the American public and most members of the current
Presidential administration. However, an increasing number of political and historical
writers and journalists have begun to discuss the notion that the United States may, after
all, resemble a traditional empire.3
2 The two Bush administrations have been forced to react to this notion on a number of
occasions. In 2003, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice was asked by a German
news team if she accepted that America could be compared to the Roman Empire. As may
perhaps be predicted, her reply was that she did not, because “the United States has no
imperial ambitions.” 4 Similarly, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was cornered by
an Al-Jazeera journalist in 2003 and asked if  the U.S.  had come to Iraq to build an
empire. Rumsfeld, again predictably, insisted that the US “is not a colonial power. We
have never been a colonial power. We don’t take our force and go around the world and
try to take other people’s real estate and other people’s resources, their oil. That’s just
not  what  the United States  does.  We never have and we never will.  That’s  not  how
democracies behave.”5
3 Rumsfeld is of course wrong here. Whether out of convenience or ignorance, he leaves
out the fact that at the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898,  the United States
acquired Guam and Puerto Rico, bought the Philippines for $20 million from Spain and
seized control of Cuba, prompting Rudyard Kipling to write his famous poem “The White
Man’s Burden”. The inclusion of the Philippines also generated a great deal of imperialist
rhetoric from President McKinley who soon launched a campaign for the “benevolent
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assimilation”  of  the  Philippines.  This  campaign  eventually  resulted  in  a  prolonged
colonial war that claimed the lives of more than 4000 American soldiers, some 16,000
Philippine soldiers and approximately 200,000 civilians.6
4 Even so,  the average American would probably still  agree with Rumsfeld’s reading of
America’s past and present. After all, the nation was founded on a revolution against an
oppressive British empire, and the Declaration of Independence is a painstaking record of
the  crimes  supposedly  committed  by  that  empire  against  the  American  people.
Furthermore, traditional American historiography tends to agree that America is not an
empire. Imperialism is not democratic, and since America is a democracy it follows that it
cannot be an empire.
5 Nevertheless, many political commentators, historians, politicians and laymen inside as
well as outside the United States have begun to diverge from this particular reading of
American history and see the comparison between the United States and the Roman
Empire as not very far-fetched after all. As a result the debate on American empire has
grown into a vast field in recent years. This debate can be understood in several ways: As
an  attempt  to  rethink  American  historiography;  an  effort  to  predict  the  challenges
America is likely to face in the future; an endeavor to establish historical and political
legitimacy for an expansive American foreign policy; or as an undertaking to debunk this
same policy through historical and political examples.
6 From this perspective, the aim of this study is thus not to attempt to answer the question:
‘Can the United States be considered a formal empire?’ The answer to this depends on the
theoretical  and  historical  position  one  assumes  when investigating  this  matter.  This
article instead surveys the ‘empire’ literature, engaging with several of the main authors
and analysing the motivations for and implications of the various standpoints taken.
7 The number of works exploring the issue of American empire is now so large that it is
unfeasible to address them all in a single article. When selecting texts for inclusion, a
range of  political  and theoretical  positions have been covered,  from Marxism to the
neoconservative right. Since the intention is to map the debate rather than decide on the
issue that is debated, the main focus is on texts with a wide circulation. Thus, more space
is given to the contested, but widely studied, Empire by Hardt and Negri than to other
neo-Marxist texts that may perhaps be more theoretically stringent, and more time is
spent discussing Noam Chomsky’s popular Hegemony or Survival than David Harvey’s more
scholarly The New Imperialism.7
2. The Discourse on American Imperialism
8 Empire has been an issue in North American history since the arrival  of Christopher
Columbus in 1492.  However,  this year is not the date foremost in the minds of most
writers exploring the notion of American empire. Instead, virtually all of those who write
or comment on American empire return to September 11, 2001. To many Americans, 9/11
signifies  a  turning  point  in  history  similar  to  the  British  capture  and  burning  of
Washington in 1814, or the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. It is also commonly
argued that these historical events triggered exceptional responses in American foreign
policy.8 For  many  of  those  critical  of  current  American  foreign  policy,  the  global
strategies following 9/11 can also be described as an exceptional response, a response
best labeled empire. In other words, government measures taken after 9/11, in particular
the War on Terror and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, but also the Patriot Act, are
visible  evidence that  we are  witnessing an imperial  epoch in  American foreign (and
domestic) policy.
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9 The beginning of the 21st century does not mark the first time America has been called
imperialistic,  of  course.  The  political  Left  protested  vocally  and  sometimes  violently
against what they referred to as US imperialism in Asia during the Korean and, especially,
the Vietnam War. However, there are a number of important differences between the
notion of American empire today and that of forty years ago. Today, America is the sole
superpower.  Its  military,  economic and cultural  might is  unsurpassed and essentially
unchallenged.  It  is  the only nation that  can be thought of  as a global  empire today.
Another important difference is the fact that the notion of American imperialism is no
longer only used pejoratively. A number of political writers and historians have proudly
declared  themselves  ‘imperialists’  and  have  argued  that  America,  whether  the
government accepts it or not, is to all extents and purposes an empire.9
10 In other words, the discourse on American empire is very heterogeneous. In this way, it is
different from the British discourse on imperialism that existed during the heyday of the
British empire.  After all,  the American discourse post-dates a tremendous number of
postcolonial  works  that  have  examined  both  the  practice  and  the  ideologies  of
imperialism.  Therefore,  empire  is  not  so  easily  presented  as  an  unproblematic
undertaking today.  The debate  on American empire  also  involves  a  debate  on when
American imperialism is meant to have begun. For some of the writers discussed here, the
genealogy of American empire is very important as it enables them to see the current
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as a continuation, rather than a break with, American
democratic tradition.
11 In order to clarify the various positions and perspectives taken in the ‘empire’ debate,
this  article  divides  the  different  authors  into  four  separate  groups.  Two groups  are
critical  of  American empire (Republicans  and Conservatives and Postcolonialists,  Marxists,
Socialists,  and Radicals), one sees it as a natural phenomenon rather than as a political
policy (Neutral Conservatives and Realists), and one is cautiously or openly optimistic on its
meaning and implications (Neoconservatives  and Liberal  Imperialists).  This  division is  in
some ways highly artificial, but it is necessary to illustrate the importance of political
outlook when discussing the matter of American empire in recent commentary.
3. The Critics of American Empire – Republicans and Conservatives
12 To begin with, British journalist Jonathan Freedland has presented what can perhaps be
named a liberal / republican critique of American foreign policy after 9/11. Freedland
argues that this policy, as evidenced in the invasion of Iraq, is essentially un-American. In
his article “Emperor George” Freedland claims that the Bush “administration, and this
war,  are  not  typical  of  the US.  On the contrary,  on almost  every measure,  they are
exceptions to the American rule.”10 To Freedland, then, the aggressive foreign policy of
the US does indeed appear as a bid for empire, but he believes that this bid is intimately
associated  with  the  ascendancy  of  George  W.  Bush and his  flock  of  neoconservative
hawks. In other words, Freedland would agree with Rumsfeld’s contention that America
has never been a colonial power, even if he would disapprove of the road Rumsfeld has
helped steer American foreign policy along.11
13 The dislike of American empire expressed by Freedland is also shared by many within US
right-wing  politics.  Former  Republican  Presidential  candidate  and  advisor  Patrick
Buchanan  has  directed  fierce  criticism  against  American  foreign  policy  as  it  has
developed since the end of the Cold War. In A Republic, Not an Empire: Reclaiming America
(1999),  Buchanan argues  that  the  policies  pursued after  the  fall  of  the  Soviet  Union
represented a dangerous deviation from traditional  American values.  He furthermore
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suggests that America might find itself facing the same imperial overstretch that ruined
the British empire: “Our country is today travelling the same path that was trod by the
British Empire – to the same fate.”12 The position of Buchanan, sometimes referred to as a
Paleoconservative, (a designation that serves, if nothing else, to differentiate his position
from  that  of  the  neoconservatives)  has  its  origins  in  US  isolationism.  According  to
isolationist principles, which can be traced back to Washington’s famous pronouncement
that Americans should not “entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European
ambition,” the US should not intervene in international affairs unless directly threatened.
13
14 Another critic is Claes G. Ryn, perhaps best described as a conservative philosopher with a
historical perspective, who published a scathing indictment of America’s foreign policy
and of its political, rhetorical and ideological underpinnings. In America the Virtuous: The
Crisis  of  Democracy  and  the  Quest  for  Empire (2003)  Ryn  argues  that  any  attempt  at
constructing a genealogy of imperialism beginning with the Founding Fathers constitutes
an  attempt  to  hijack  national  prestige  while  simultaneously  subverting  American
democracy.14 Like  Freedland  and  Buchanan,  Ryn  firmly believes  that  the  Founding
Fathers of the United States had democratic, as opposed to imperialist, ambitions, and,
again like Freedland and Buchanan, he suggests that this fact ought to steer American
politics away from imperialist ambitions.15
15 Finally,  in  Incoherent  Empire  (2003),  Michael  Mann  also  proposes  that  American
imperialism is essentially new. Mann is a sociologist and is careful not to ally himself with
any political faction, calling himself a scholar rather than an activist. Consequently it is
not a straightforward matter to include him in this first group, but he does argue that
empire  is  a  relatively  new phase  of  US foreign policy.  This  phase  can be  related to
Clinton’s penchant for nation building and an aggressive foreign policy in the wake of the
Cold War,  but he names “world-historical  bad luck” as the main contributing factor,
referring here to a  malfunctioning electoral  system,  the sudden rise  of  the “chicken
hawks” of the Bush administration, and the terrorist attacks of 9/11.16
16 In Mann’s view, this bad luck has conspired to create a wave of new imperialism that
must ultimately be understood as rampant militarism. While it  may perhaps be well-
meaning, it stumbles across the globe, leaving death and destruction rather than peace
and democratic process in its wake. To Mann, this is a path that the American voting
public  can,  should,  and  probably  will  abandon as  the  moral  and,  more  importantly,
financial price of new imperialism becomes clear to them.
4. The Critics of American Empire – Postcolonialists, Marxists, Socialists, and Radicals
17 To Ryn, Buchanan, Mann, and Freedland, imperialism and the recent trends in US foreign
policy  represent  certain ‘un-American’  tendencies.  Thus,  the  War  on Terror  and the
rhetoric which accompanies it appear to them as a distortion of an ancient, American
democratic ideal.
18 However, this view is perceived as simplistic by many other writers, and while they may
certainly agree with Freedland that the current aggressive foreign policy of the Bush
administration  is  essentially  undemocratic,  they  doubt  that  there  is  anything  un-
American  about  it.  The  US,  they  claim,  was  firmly  acting  within  a  long-established
tradition when it invaded both Afghanistan and Iraq. 
19 To writers working within the field of postcolonial studies, this is familiar intellectual
territory.  In his seminal work Culture and Imperialism (1993),  Edward Said argues that
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while the British and French empires of the early twentieth century have fallen apart,
imperialism is far from dead, and he suggests, quoting extensively from other writers,
that the United States is the nation that today shoulders the burden of empire.17 Other
central figures in this field, such as Hamid Dabashi, have also explored what can perhaps
best  be  described  as  the  American  (neo)  colonial  venture.  Indeed,  American
expansionism, along with the (popular) culture that has accompanied this expansionism,
has, to some extent, revitalized the field of both postcolonialism and Cultural Geography,
producing works such as Melani McAlister’s Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and US Interests
in the Middle East, 1945-2000 (2001) and David Harvey’s The New Imperialism (2003).18
20 Postcolonial  studies  have,  of  course,  drawn  significant  theoretical  inspiration  from
Marxist studies of imperialism, and Marxists and neo-Marxists have provided significant,
if not always widely circulated, contributions to the discussion on US Empire. Among
those labeling themselves as neo-Marxists are Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, authors
of the provocative Empire (2000). Empire is a controversial text which claims that while
America  may  not  be  exactly  imperialistic,  it  is  certainly  an  Empire.  However,  with
‘Empire’ Hardt and Negri do not refer to a nation state colonizing the world to protect its
trade,  but  a  more  diffuse  entity  described  as  “a  network  of  power  structures  and
counterbalances structured into an inclusive and unlimited architecture.”19  In the wake
of  globalization  and  global  mass  media,  this  entity  serves  as  the  center  of  Western
capitalist order.
21 The discussion that ensues owes much to postmodern thinkers such as Foucault, Deleuze,
and Gramsci, and Empire has itself been criticized by Marxist scholars. Marxists have after
all called the US an empire since the foundation of Marxist ideology. If imperialism is the
highest stage of capitalism, as Lenin would have it, it makes sense to think of the United
States  as  a  bastion  of,  at  least,  cultural  and  economic  imperialism  and,  increasingly,
material and military imperialism as well. 
22 However,  in  the  political  and  historical  landscape  of  the  United  States,  Marxist
historiography  has  generally  lacked  impact.  Nevertheless  there  is  a  significant
community of, if not Marxist, then certainly Left-leaning radical scholars in the US, many
of whom being well placed within the academic community and able to use this position
to interrogate US foreign policy. The most well-known radical critic of US expansionist
policy is Noam Chomsky. Chomsky, referred to as both an anarchist and a libertarian
socialist,  has  waged a  long war  against  American empire,  and his  book Hegemony  or
Survival:  Americas  Quest  for  Global  Dominance (2003)  deals  explicitly  with this  problem.
Unlike Freedland, Chomsky does not believe that American empire rose out of the ashes
of the World Trade Center.20 A crucial claim in his book is that American foreign policy
today is characterized, and long has been characterized, by what he calls an “Imperial
Grand Strategy”. Chomsky has borrowed this term from John Ikenberry and traces the
“basic principles” of an “American imperial grand strategy” back at least to “the early
days of World War II.”21 Chomsky argues that “[even] before the US entered the war
[WWII],  high level planners and analysts concluded that in the postwar world the US
would seek ‘to hold unquestioned power,’ acting to ensure the ‘limitation of any exercise
of sovereignty’ by states that might interfere with its global designs.”22
23 Chomsky contends that current imperial grand strategy was clearly outlined in the 2002
National Security Strategy. For Chomsky the only change that 9/11 signified as far as
foreign policy is concerned was a willingness by the Bush administration to act upon this
strategy  with  determination  and  ruthlessness.  Chomsky’s  work  is  part  of  a  larger
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American Empire project, consisting of 17 volumes by late 2007, and a fellow author in
this series is Chalmers Johnson. As early as 2000, in Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of
American  Empire,  Johnson  predicted  that  the  American  empire  was  going  to  face
considerable resistance around the globe in the form of terrorism and social unrest.23
Later, in The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (2004), Johnson
does not perceive American empire to begin after 9/11 but argues that its roots go back to
the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 “when the United States declared all of Latin America its
sphere of influence and busily enlarged its own territory at the expense of the indigenous
people of North America.”24
24 Furthermore, Johnson takes direct issue with those who claim that in order to qualify as
an empire, you have to have formal colonies. For those that deny that America is an
empire, this absence of formal colonies is crucial evidence that America, after all, is not
the new Roman or British empire. To Johnson, the lack of formal colonies proves little.
Today, the US has established more than 725 bases throughout the world, and Johnson
argues effectively that the establishment of these bases alone qualifies America as an
empire, despite the fact that it has annexed few territories:
These  bases  continued  through  a  chain  of  command  and  supervised  by  the
Pentagon without any civilian oversight, were tied into our developing military-
industrial complex and deeply affected the surrounding indigenous cultures, almost
invariably for the worse.  They have helped turn us into a new kind of  military
empire – a consumerist Sparta, a warrior culture that flaunts the air-conditioned
housing, movie theatres,  supermarkets,  golf  courses,  and swimming pools,  of its
legionnaires.25
Whatever the original reason the United States entered a country and set up a base,
it remains there for imperial reasons – regional and global hegemony, denial of the
territory  to  rivals,  providing  access  for  American  companies,  maintenance  of
‘stability’ or ‘credibility’ as a military force, and simple inertia.26
25 Johnson continues his critique of American imperial ambition in his most recent book,
Nemesis:  The  Last  Days  of  the  American  Republic  (2006),  where  he  echoes  Chomsky  in
cautioning the American citizen: “Like the Chinese, Ottoman, Hapsburg, imperial German,
Nazi, imperial Japanese, British, French, Dutch, Portuguese, and Soviet empires in the last
century, we are approaching the edge of a huge waterfall and are about to plunge over
it.”27
5. Dissecting the Nature of American Imperialism – Neutral Conservatives and Realists
26 To Chomsky and Johnson, as to Ryn and Buchanan, American empire is bad by default. To
others, as we shall see, it is a development to be celebrated. However, a number of writers
are reluctant to take sides, and seem content with analyzing America’s state in the world.
Many of these writers can be labeled Realists, Neorealists or perhaps Liberal Realists, as
they are interested in the proliferation of American power as such rather than in the
ethics of this proliferation. Their audience tends to be those involved in International
Relations and many are, or have been, involved in government agencies concerned with
the making of foreign policy.
27 A prolific and widely read author whose first work can be said to belong to this category
is Andrew J. Bacevich. His American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy
states  that  “like  it  or  not,  America  today  is  Rome,  committed  irreversibly  to  the
maintenance and, where feasible, expansion of an empire that differs from every other
empire in history. This is hardly a matter for celebration; but neither is there any purpose
served by denying the facts.”28 In his book, Bacevich discusses a development that began
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in 1898 with the Spanish-American War and which was later infinitely accelerated with
the  fall  of  the  Soviet  Union.  To  Bacevich,  the  notion  of  America  as  the  “reluctant
superpower”, thrust unwillingly onto the international arena and more or less forced by
outside agency to join WWI and WWII, invade Vietnam, attack Iraq in 1990 and bomb the
Serbs  in  1999,  is  a  myth.  In  place  of  this  myth,  Bacevich  traces  a  seemingly  well-
structured, if unarticulated, “strategy of openness” which has kept US foreign policy on
track, especially after the end of the Cold War. This strategy, fuelled by the need for a
growing economy, has made the US resemble the Roman (rather than the British) empire,
with proconsuls in every part of the world. Bacevich is wary of this development, but the
purpose of American Empire is not to condemn it, but to explore it.
28 In  more  recent  publications  Bacevich  is  much more  critical.  Greatly  opposed  to  the
invasion of Iraq, he has focused his analysis of American empire on the militarism that
follows in its wake. His most recent book, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are
Seduced by War (2005), a work praised by Chalmers Johnson, is a thoroughly historical
investigation,  and  a  thorough condemnation,  of  American  militarism.  It  is  therefore
appropriate to view Bacevich as a conservative critic of American empire today.29
29 Other  writers  who have  contented  themselves,  in  Realist  fashion,  with  mapping  the
evolution of  American empire  include William J.  Odon,  former  Head of  the  National
Security Council, and foreign policy expert Robert Dujarric. In America’s Inadvertent Empire
(2004) they argue, like Bacevich, that the US is indeed imperial: 
[The]  United  States  has  created,  perhaps  inadvertently,  a  new type  of  imperial
regime. It is an empire, but not the traditional kind. Structurally and qualitatively it
differs fundamentally from all past empires. Using the terms imperial and empire
risks  confusion  because  those  words  convey  notions  of  a  hierarchy  of  power,
subordination, and dominance that are either missing from the American empire or
only loosely institutionalized. Yet it is difficult to find apter terminology.30
30 Odom and Dujarric see nothing inherently problematic with the United States having
acquired this power. To them, it is perceived as a natural consequence of the break-up of
the Soviet Union.  Furthermore,  they see American empire positively as a network of
alliances with other nation states. Thus, while the proper center of the empire is the
United States, it depends on peripheral centers of power such as Britain, France or, in
some cases, the United Nations.
31 Odon and Dujarric are reluctant to comment on the nature of the policy behind, or the
moral character of, the invasions of Afghanistan or Iraq. In fact, these authors do not
discuss these invasions as evidence that America is an empire at all. Instead, they are
interested  in  the  impact  that  these  operations  will  have  on  continued  American
hegemony. Significantly they perceive no actual outside threat to the American empire at
this stage in history: “Outside challengers are not a serious threat to it – neither rising
powers like China nor Al Qaeda and similar nonstate organizations. They can cause the
United States pain and damage, but they cannot destroy American hegemony.”31 Instead,
Odom and Dujarric argue, the real threat to continued American predominance comes
from within. Through ill-advised unilateral action in which the US fails to recognize and
make use of its imperial allies and members, the singularly powerful American empire
may ultimately flounder and collapse.
32 In America’s Inadvertent Empire Odom and Dujarric seem to suspect that the invasion of
Iraq is an example of precisely such ill-advised unilateral action. However, they are also
prepared to be proved wrong: “If Iraq were to emerge as a stable state with a moderate
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regime willing to cooperate with the United States, and if other regional states such as
Syria and Iran were to do the same, the American empire would emerge even stronger.”32
33 In  this  way,  Odon  and  Dujarric  see  American  empire,  or  American  hegemonic
preponderance, as a historical fact that must be taken into consideration. From a Realist
perspective, it is the failure of taking this fact into consideration, rather than the fact
itself, that may spell disaster for America. In other words, if the citizens of the United
States do not realize that America is effectively an empire, it risks falling apart due to a
lack of understanding of its global limitations, needs and purposes. The invasion of Iraq in
2003,  and  the  Bush  doctrine  that  prompted  it,  are  furthermore,  and  perhaps
paradoxically,  seen  as  evidence  that  the  Bush  government  has  failed  to  realize  the
imperial responsibilities of the United States.  The invasion thus serves as a threat to
continued American global dominance and leadership, rather than as the final evidence
that America has imperialistic or neocolonial tendencies.33
34 The Realists or neutral conservatives that are concerned with American empire treat it
primarily as a confluence of power and a political phenomenon rather than as a moral
problem. However, it is, of course, problematic to suggest that the avoidance to celebrate
or  indict  American  empire  is  in  any  way  politically  neutral.  At  the  same time,  this
position does  not  resemble  that  of  the  more  optimistic  neoconservatives  and liberal
imperialists who tend to view American empire, or at least American hegemony, as a
potential blessing for a world torn by religious conflict, sectarian violence and political
oppression.
6. Voices Hailing American Empire – Neoconservatives and Liberal Imperialists 
35 What is today referred to as the neoconservative movement can be traced back to the
1950s when disillusionment with and within the New Left, combined with the political
philosophy of among others Leo Strauss and Lionel Trilling, generated a new form of
conservatism. The liberal or even socialist background of this new breed of conservative
made them precisely “New Conservatives”. The ‘neocons’, never a perfectly homogenous
group, nevertheless seem to agree that American global leadership is good both for the
US and for the world, and that the US should, in the wake of the Cold War, aggressively
pursue a position of economic and military supremacy. Referring to the Monroe Doctrine
and Theodore Roosevelt’s  Corollary as  examples of  how America has been willing to
regulate the business of other nations in the past, neocons have argued that the US has a
moral obligation to interfere militarily where the international order, especially when
related to American interests, is threatened.34
36 A neocon journalist and historian who has shown a pronounced interest in the concept of
American imperialism is Max Boot. Even though Boot has said that he is not sure what it
means to be a neocon, his vision of American history and of current American foreign
policy is  probably best  labeled as neoconservative,  and his  articles  have appeared in
collections  of  neoconservative  writing.  In  the  wake  of  9/11,  Boot  received  a  lot  of
attention for his book on American history and international politics entitled Savage Wars
of  Peace:  Small  Wars  and the Rise  of  American Power.  The title,  of  course,  is  taken from
Kipling’s aforementioned poem “White Man’s Burden”, but Boot intends neither irony
nor sarcasm in using it. Boot’s basic argument is that America’s military history, contrary
to common belief and historiography, is a history of “savage wars of peace” or “imperial
wars”.35 Most of the book deals with a series of military conflicts ranging from 1801 to the
Gulf War in the early 1990s. To Boot, the Monroe Doctrine is a crucial document which
can be seen as evidence that empire was contemplated early on in the history of the
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United States. In fact, it may be argued that the entire text is an attempt to show that
empire is part and parcel of American history and that American military history has
been an attempt  to  enforce  Pax Americana throughout  the  world.  Neither  Chalmers
Johnson nor Chomsky would necessarily take issue with this. What Johnson and Chomsky
would take issue with is Boot’s contention that this has been a good thing and that it does
not conflict with American democratic values.
37 In Savage Wars of Peace, as well as in other publications, Boot comes across as one of the
most vocal and optimistic supporters of American empire. In “The Case for American
Empire”, published shortly after 9/11, he argues that “Afghanistan and other troubled
lands today cry out for the sort of enlightened foreign administration once provided by
self-confident Englishmen in jodhpurs and pith helmets.”36 In a more recent article Boot
claims the following:
U.S. imperialism has been the greatest force for good in the world during the past
century. It has defeated the monstrous evils of communism and Nazism and lesser
evils such as the Taliban and Serbian ethnic cleansing. Along the way, it has helped
spread liberal institutions to countries as diverse as South Korea and Panama.37 
38 Boot thus supports interventionism and unilateralism as expressed, for example, in the
invasion of  Iraq.  He  regrets  the  fact  that  the  US  government  has  been reluctant  to
embrace  the  term American  empire,  although  he  can  understand  why  they  do  not.
However,  he  is  adamant  that  if  they  are  unable  to  accept  the  word,  they  should
“definitely embrace the practice.”38
39 The British conservative historian Paul Johnson seconds this argument. Johnson, who
received  the  Presidential  Medal  of  Freedom  in  2006,  has  repeatedly  argued,  like  a
reincarnated  Kipling,  that  the  US  must  shoulder  its  imperial  burden.  Like  Boot  and
Chalmers Johnson, Paul Johnson traces the origins of American empire back to the start
of the Republic, arguing that “the Americans were more imperialist than the English” at
the time of the American Revolution.39 Having traced the imperial genealogy back to the
inception of the United States,  Johnson can argue that Empire is part of the original
American ideological make-up: 
[I]t  is  worth recalling that up to 1860 “empire” was not a term of abuse in the
United States. George Washington himself spoke of “the rising American Empire.”
Jefferson, aware of the dilemma, claimed that America was “an Empire for liberty.”
That is what America is becoming again, in fact if not in name. America’s search for
the security against terrorism and rogue states goes hand in hand with liberating
their oppressed peoples. From the Evil Empire to an Empire for Liberty is a giant
step, a contrast as great as the appalling images of the wasted twentieth century
and the brightening dawn of the twenty-first. But America has the musculature and
the will to take giant steps, as it has shown in the past.40
40 Another British historian who supports this claim is Niall Ferguson. Ferguson, sometimes
labeled a liberal imperialist, is originally a historian of British imperialism. In Empire: The
Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power (2003) he attempts
an interesting revision of British imperialism, painting it in much brighter colors than
more critical  imperial  historians  such  as  Eric  Hobsbawm  or  Lawrence  James.41 The
practice of imperialism may not have fared well in the historical, literary and political
writing of the past 60 years or so, but Ferguson goes against this orthodoxy, and the
timing  of  Empire and  its  follow-up  Colossus:  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  American  Empire,
published in 2004 was excellent. Ferguson now holds fellowships and professorships at
New York University, Oxford and Stanford.
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41 To Ferguson, as to Boot and Paul Johnson, there is nothing inherently wrong with empire.
Empires, he argues, can serve both the needs of the imperial centre, the metropolis, and
the periphery. That is, they can be altruistic. He acknowledges that the history of the
British empire has its dark moments, but suggests that the empire’s encouragement of
free trade compensates for this. He dismisses the notion the “all empires are exploitative
in character” with the claim that “there can be – and has been – such a thing as a liberal
empire, one that enhances its own security and prosperity precisely by providing the rest
of the world with generally beneficial public goods.”42
42 Like Chalmers Johnson, Ferguson also addresses the notion that America cannot be an
empire because it does not have any formal colonies, and, again like Johnson, Ferguson
mentions the proliferation of American military bases all over the world. He furthermore
points out that empire is not simply “direct rule over foreign territories without any
political representation of their inhabitants.”43 In his view, America is largely an empire
ruling  “indirectly”  “through  the  agency  of  local  potentates  rather  than  British
governors.”44 It  is  thus  an  “informal  empire.” 45 To  Ferguson,  then,  the  US  has  the
makings of the type of “liberal empire” that he thinks the world needs:
What is required is a liberal empire–that is to say, one that not only underwrites
the free international exchange of commodities, labor and capital but also creates
and  upholds  the  conditions  without  which  markets  cannot  function–peace  and
order, the rule of law, noncorrupt administrations.46
43 To return to American history, a central thesis in Colossus is “not merely that the United
States is an empire but that it always has been an empire.”47 Ferguson then goes to great
lengths tracing the genealogy of American empire back to the origin of the United States,
claiming in words strikingly similar to those of Paul Johnson that “there were no more
self-confident imperialists than the Founding Fathers themselves.”48 Like Boot, Ferguson
also  stresses  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  proof  that  the  imperialist  tendencies  of  the
Founding Fathers were continued, and he furthermore argues that both the Roosevelt
corollary and the Wilson corollary are additional evidence that the US continued along
that road.49
44 However, at the end of the day, Colossus, as is implied by its title, is not as optimistic as
anything written by Boot or Paul Johnson. Ferguson is unsure whether the US is prepared
to shoulder the white man’s burden, and he fears that it risks imperial overstretch. The
US is borrowing billions of dollars from Asia to fund its invasion of Iraq - How is the
nation to afford such a sustained imperial enterprise? He also suggests that there is little
domestic  enthusiasm  for  the  imperial  assignment,  and  that  the  nation’s  “elite”  is
particularly uninterested in pursuing imperial careers: “Few, if any, of the graduates of
Harvard, Stanford, Yale or Princeton aspire to spend their lives trying to turn a sun-
scorched sandpit like Iraq into the prosperous capitalist democracy of Paul Wolfowitz’s
imaginings.”50 
45 Thus, Ferguson worries about imperial denial. While many people outside the US have
begun to accept or perhaps resign themselves to the notion of American empire,  the
people of the US are still caught up in “full-blown myopia” as Ferguson puts it.51 This is
important, he argues, as the US will as a result keep on “allocating insufficient resources
to the non-military aspects” of all the imperial projects it becomes involved with.52 The
nation will also tend to “attempt economic and political transformation in an
unrealistically short time frame,”53 something the author claims is happening in Iraq and
Afghanistan as he writes.
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46 To conclude this section, attention will be given to an erudite study from 2006, Among
Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors, by Charles S. Maier. Using a number of
historical examples, Maier distinguishes between being an empire and having an empire.
Taking the cue from historian Geoffrey Hoskins, Maier suggests that while Russia during
the reign of  the Tsar was an empire in the sense that  it  subjected its  citizens to an
authoritarian rule, Britain had an empire since it allowed the British public considerable
political  freedom  and  reserved  the  more  dictatorial  aspects  of  imperialism  for  the
colonies.54
47 At times, Maier describes US imperial tendencies as highly problematic, especially since,
as he states, “the lifeblood of empires is blood.”55 He predicts that a continual embrace of
imperial practice and the creation of “imperial institutions” will both generate violence
in many places around the globe and may erode civil rights within the US. Nevertheless
Maier suggests that American empire might bring with it certain benefits.  In fact,  he
argues that within the US, to “slide toward empire would still allow an ever more diverse
American society  to  persevere  in  its  growing acceptance  of  multiculturalism and its
toleration  of  immigrants  and  minorities.”56 From  an  international  perspective,  an
imperial regime might be able to further the “commitment to spread democracy outside
the United States.”57
48 Perhaps  to  underline  how  an  empire  might,  paradoxically,  further  democratic
institutions inside and outside the US, the cover of the book reproduces American painter
Thomas Cole’s 1836 painting “Course of Empire: Consummation”. This painting is part of
a  series  of  five  depicting  the  birth,  development,  consummation,  destruction  and
desolation  of  empire,  and  it  is  telling  that  Among  Empires is  enveloped  by  the
consummation phase which, in turn, is represented by a Classical empire in all its white
marble and splendor. 
7. Conclusion
49 It would be easy, perhaps, to bombard the academic performance of writers such as Boot
and Ferguson with the vast arsenal of critique produced by postcolonial studies. Indeed,
Ferguson’s contention that free trade is an a priori good is perhaps a dubious claim and
has drawn much criticism from the Left. Similarly, Boot tends to overlook the darker
aspects and consequences of imperial practice, and Maier’s contention that the imperial
reconstitution of  American political  life may further democracy nationally as well  as
internationally seems somewhat naïve.
50 However, the object of this paper is not to determine whether America is an empire or
not, or even if it ought to be one or not. Instead, the focus is on how and why these
writers explore the notion of empire itself. From this perspective, it would seem that
most  take issue with mainstream American historical  tradition.  As  I  have suggested,
according  to  this  tradition  American  imperialism  was  a  brief  and  misguided  phase
occurring almost  accidentally  after  the end of  the Spanish-American War in 1898.  It
furthermore states  that  while  the US has certainly exerted a great  deal  of  power in
various parts of the world,  this power has been, for the most part,  economic and/or
cultural.
51 I  would  suggest  that  this  attempt  to  revise  traditional  American  history  can  be
understood  in  two  ways,  and  these  ways  are  not  mutually  exclusive.  Firstly,  the
revisionist histories produced by neoconservative and liberal imperialist historians can
be perceived as attempts to establish a form of historical legitimacy for American empire.
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Secondly, these histories, as well as other works less optimistic about empire, can also be
seen as a re-evaluation of American history that is essentially sincere and part of a broad,
iconoclastic attempt at understanding America’s past and present. 
52 To focus on the first aspect, it should be noted that the position of Jefferson and the
Founding Fathers is of crucial importance. Those who see American empire as possibly
beneficial for both world order and American society seem particularly eager to trace its
genealogy back to Jefferson and the Founding Fathers of the American Republic. Paul
Johnson and Niall Ferguson both insist that when independence was declared in North
America, it was quickly followed by a vision of empire. Although these writers do not rest
their  entire case on this  origin,  it  appears  to be important  for  them to establish an
imperial  genealogy going back to  the  beginnings  of  American democracy.  It  may be
presumed that connecting current imperial practice to the political philosophy of the 18th
century in this way lends a definite legitimacy to the entire project. This does not mean
that these writers unconditionally embrace American empire – indeed, both Fergusson
and Maier predict that American imperialism faces serious and perhaps insurmountable
obstacles – but it does allow them to discuss the notion as an inherently American, and
therefore legitimate, phenomenon.
53 Thus, it is possible to perceive Boot’s, Paul Johnson’s and Ferguson’s attempts to trace the
genealogy of  American empire back to the nation’s birth as a part of  a political  and
rhetorical  project.  The Bush administrations have struggled to acquire legitimacy for
their forceful foreign policy and for remaining in Iraq despite the growing unpopularity
of the war. With the discovery that Saddam Hussein did not possess Weapons of Mass
Destruction, the only reason for remaining in Iraq is to stabilize the region. With the state
of the nation deteriorating into civil war, this aim seems difficult, if not impossible, to
achieve.
54 Boot  and  Ferguson  come  in  handy  here,  presenting  a  different  way  of  viewing  the
conflict.  Boot  assures  his  readers  that  there  is  no need to  run away from the  label
American imperialism because America has been an empire since its inception. Ferguson
and  Paul  Johnson  second  this  claim by  assuring  likewise  that  the  Founding  Fathers
themselves were ardent imperialists,  and if  that is so then there can certainly be no
conflict between the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and current foreign
policy.
55 Interestingly, some of those who resist the notion of American empire also look back to
the 18th century, this time to disprove the notion that any connection between current
American foreign policy and the beginning of the American Republic actually exists. To
Ryn, Freedland, and Buchanan, the creation of the American Republic was essentially an
indictment of imperialism. By taking this position, they are able to claim that the current
phase of American foreign policy, begun during the Clinton era and intensified with the
(neoconservative) reaction to 9/11, is essentially at odds with the American republican
tradition. Sounding somewhat like a Supreme Court decision after having consulted the
Constitution, Buchanan declares that America is “A Republic, Not an Empire”. In this way,
these writers are reluctant to revise the traditional historical trajectory of the United
States.
56 To return to Boot, Ferguson, and Paul Johnson, the fact that their revision of American
history may be perceived as a part of a rhetorical project does not mean that they do not
have a point when they say that America grew out of an imperialistic tradition and that
current foreign policy can be traced back to this tradition. The United States was indeed a
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rather insignificant strip of land on the East Coast at the end of the Revolution. Some 50
years later, through a process that can really only be described as colonization, the nation
stretched from sea to sea.58 Historian John Lewis Gaddis has explored this in his Surprise,
Security, and the American Experience. In this book, he does not declare that America should
embrace its imperial heritage, or even that such a heritage exists, but he does argue that
principles of hegemony, unilateralism and pre-emption go back to the earliest days of the
Republic.59 
57 This is also the position of many of those critical of the current state of American foreign
policy. Chomsky and Chalmers Johnson are uninterested in the Founding Fathers as icons
of American democracy, but they are not unwilling to trace American imperial practice
back to  the beginning of  the Republic.  Obviously,  this  is  not  in  order  to  establish a
principle by which current  American foreign policy can be structured,  but  rather to
investigate the relationship between the rise of American power and imperial practice
and to speculate on the consequences of this practice.
58 Furthermore,  like  Boot,  Ferguson,  and Paul  Johnson,  these writers  certainly  have an
agenda. Chomsky and Chalmers Johnson write their studies on American empire in an
attempt to explain the dire consequences of American imperialism. To Chomsky, it is a
matter of the survival of the human race, as he predicts Armageddon if the US does not
come to its senses. To Chalmers Johnson and Michael Mann, the continuation of American
empire will further a militarism that will rot the American Republic to the core, throw
poorer nations into financial despair and eventually end American hegemony altogether.
59 Those who care less about the historical background still tend to second this warning.
The early texts by Bacevich, along with International Relations scholars such as Odom
and Dujarric, see the American invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq not
necessarily as the beginning of American empire, but possibly as the beginning of its
demise.  Like Chomsky, Chalmers Johnson, and Michael Mann, they believe that these
wars may eventually throw the US into financial chaos and military confusion. However,
to  Odom  and  Dujarric,  the  legitimacy  of  these  wars  has  little  to  do  with  moral
considerations. Instead, the end result of these invasions will determine whether they
were politically wise or not. If the invasions manage to stabilize the region, Odom and
Dujarric  are  happy  to  embrace  them as  good  foreign  policy.  If  they  turn  out  to  be
catastrophic, however, they constitute no more than poor foreign policy. 
60 Ultimately,  political  beliefs  determine  which  position  is  taken  in  the  struggle  over
America’s  imperial  past  and future.  But  it  is  clear  that,  regardless  of  one’s  political
position, it makes limited sense to view American empire as a recent phenomenon arising
as a consequence of 9/11 and the subsequent declaration of the War on Terror. Too many
voices are claiming, for different reasons, that 9/11 was not so much the beginning of
American imperialism, but instead an opportunity to re-think and re-theorize American
historiography  and  current  American  foreign  policy  around  the  notion  of  empire.
Imperial denial may be convenient for the servants of the US government, but it is hardly
practical for any serious student of America’s historical past and political present.
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